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Problems with Hume’s ‘Definitions of Cause’ (survey thesis): 
From the Viewpoint of ‘Analytical Arguments’ and ‘Anti-Analytical Arguments’ 
Masumi Aoki 
0. Introduction 
‘A causes B’. In our everyday life, we routinely observe and describe particular pairs of objects or events as 
having a causal relationship. That is, we assert that two particular separate objects, A and B, are linked in a 
particular manner. What enables this linkage? It can be said that this question raises one of the major 
problems in the philosophy of David Hume. According to Hume, many thinkers in their traditional meta-
physical arguments have advanced the notion that some kind of ‘power’ exists linking A to B. However, 
Hume asserted that it is absurd to suppose that there is a ‘power’ between A and B since it is impossible for 
us to perceive this ‘power’ in any way. Yet, insofar as we think that A and B are necessarily connected, it 
would seem nonsense to insist that causation does not exist. In short, Hume’s finding was that there is no 
power between A and B, but rather we have the experience of ‘constant conjunction’ in which two partic-
ular objects are contiguous, and one preceding the other. According to Hume, this experience of constant 
conjunction enables us to form the habit of uniting the two objects, and it is from a projection of this 
feeling of uniting enforcement that our idea of necessity derives. 
Hume’s theory of causation may indeed be caught in this way, but given the complexity of Hume’s de-
scription, there are many details that do not seem to suit with this large frame. Hume’s two ‘definitions of 
cause’, which appear late in the causal theory he presents in his Treatise1 and first Enquiry2, constitute one 
of these details. Although these two ‘definitions of cause’ at a glance appear as a formulation of Hume’s 
causal theory, should they really be treated as a true summary of that theory? What did Hume really mean 
when he presented his definitions in this manner? Many researchers have taken on the challenge of inter-
preting his intent. 
The first critics of Hume’s causal theory were Thomas Reid (1710-96) and Henry Home Lord Kames 
(1696-1782), who lived contemporaneously with Hume. Later, while Robinson, Richards, and Gotterbarn 
argued about the logical equivalence between Hume’s two definitions, Kemp Smith and Galen Strawson 
broadened the discussion and offered unique interpretations of Hume’s definitions. In this thesis, I provide 
an overview of the various interpretations that have been offered, distinguishing between what I label ‘an-
alytical interpretations’, which mainly address the pure logical equivalence between the two definitions, and 
the ‘anti-analytical interpretations’, which seek to understand the definitions in the full context of Hume’s 
causal theory. The former (analytical) interpretations regard the two definitions literally, as pure logical 
definitions, and apply their own semantic analysis to help our understanding of Hume’s theory, while the 
latter (anti-analytical) interpretations can be said to remove the former’s assumption of ‘linguistic defini-
                                                          
1  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) 
2  ―, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1747) 
 - 14 - 
tions’ and attempt to find Hume’s true motive for ‘defining’ causation in such a way. 
 
In the first chapter of this paper, problems with Hume’s ‘definitions of cause’, as presented in his Trea-
tise, are identified. A survey of critical ‘analytical arguments’ is then provided in the second chapter; ‘an-
ti-analytical arguments’ are presented in the third.  
 
1. Hume’s ‘definitions of cause’ 
1.1. ‘Definitions of cause’ problem 
Hume’s causal theory appears primarily in the third part of the Treatise, Book 1. It is near the end of Part 3, 
in the 14th section, that he presents his two ‘definitions of cause’3: 
Definition 1 (D1): (We may define a CAUSE to be) ‘An object precedent and contiguous to another, 
and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and conti-
guity to those objects, that resemble the latter.’ (T 1.3.14.31)4 
Definition 2 (D2): ‘(A CAUSE is) an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, 
that the idea, of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the 
one to form a more lively idea of the other.’ (ibid.) 
My thesis focuses on the following two points: First, Hume has proposed the two definitions as a summa-
rization of his causal theory. In fact, Lord Kames and Reid criticized the definitions based on the assump-
tion that they are at least a sufficient conclusion of Hume’s causal theory. However, are these two defini-
tions, in reality, truly sufficient summaries of Hume’s theory? Indeed, this issue has become a significant 
problem among interpreters. My second point is that there is a problem with the relationship between the 
two definitions. Hume states that the two definitions are ‘only different by their presenting a different view 
of the same object’ (ibid.). That is, according to Hume, although the views that each of the definitions 
presented are different, they carry the same essential meaning. At first reading, Hume’s assertion is difficult 
to grasp. In what sense are they ‘different’ or ‘the same’? Robinson, Richards, and Gotterbarn explored the 
logical equivalence between the two definitions.  
In the history of Hume’s causal theory, from the time Hume lived to the beginning of the 20th century, 
many researchers, including Reid and James Beattie (1735-1803), have held a standard interpretation of 
Hume, which sees him as a strong sceptic. These researchers shared a generally low opinion of Hume’s 
                                                          
3  Hume discusses the ‘definitions of cause’ both in the Treatise and in the first Enquiry, and the expressions in these two 
places are subtly different. However, the import of the ‘definitions of cause’ themselves is said to be the same. Therefore, 
in this thesis, I will mainly use the expressions from the Treatise.  
4  For the Treatise, reference is indicated by the letter T, followed by book, part, section, and paragraph number. For the 
first Enquiry, reference is indicated by E, followed by section, part, and paragraph number. Hence, for example: T 
1.3.14.31; E 7.2.29. In addition, (…) is added by for the clarification of meaning of a sentence. 
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definitions of cause. However, their standard interpretation proved to be erroneous, at least according to 
Norman Kemp-Smith, who wrote ‘The Naturalism of Hume’ (1905). In his work, for the first time, Hume’s 
definitions of cause were positively valued. Kemp-Smith influenced later Hume interpreters in significant 
ways: Throughout the middle of the 20th century, the analytical interpreters gave negative responses, while 
the anti-analytical interpreters such as Strawson advanced their research along the direction of 
Kemp-Smith’s arguments. From the second half of the 20th century to today, the latter arguments have held 
the initiative. In fact, one of the main themes running through efforts in the 1990s to re-ignite interest in 
Hume in the so-called ‘New Hume Debate’ focused on trying to understand Hume’s intention in ‘defining’ 
cause as he did. 
 
1.2. For the ‘definitions of cause’ in the Treatise 
In order to establish a clear difference between the two definitions (designated D1 and D2), we can consider 
them in a cognitive model: ‘I observe a causal relationship in which A causes B’. On examination, it appears 
that D1 does not include the viewpoint of the observer; that is, there is no ‘I’ in D1. D1 simply describes the 
observable state that ‘A causes B’. On the other hand, D2 expresses the ‘A causes B’ relationship as an event 
that happens in the mind of the observer. 
In order to analyse these contrasting notions in closer detail, let us examine them with a concrete ex-
ample in which a cause, ‘the collision of billiard ball A with billiard ball B’, is paired with an effect, ‘the 
motion of billiard ball B’. Under definition D1, such a situation can be examined using each of the two 
parts of the definition: the first part (D1a) corresponding to D1’s opening words, ‘We may define a CAUSE 
to be an object precedent and contiguous to another’, and the second part (D1b) corresponding to the re-
mainder of D1, ‘where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency and 
contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter’. In D1a, it is said that a cause and an effect are put in a 
relationship of ‘contiguity’ and a relationship of ‘succession’. That is, Hume’s first observation in D1 is that, 
if two objects (events) are in a causal relationship, one object follows on the other and the two are con-
tiguous. In our example, the event ‘the motion of billiard ball B’ follows on the other event ‘the collision of 
billiard ball A with billiard ball B’, and they are contiguous to one another5. With reference to D1b, it can 
be said that, in all other instances involving the ‘collision’ and the ‘motion’ that have happened, or will 
happen, A and B are always in this same relationship of ‘succession’ and ‘contiguity’. In other words, 
Hume’s second observation in D1 is that the ‘collision’ and the ‘motion’ are in a relation of ‘constant con-
junction’. Thus, this is the relationship of ‘succession’, ‘contiguity’, and ‘constant conjunction’ that D1 
describes in the Treatise. 
In D2, the relationship of ‘contiguity’ and ‘succession’ is the same as in D1. The difference between D1 
                                                          
5  According to Hume, the relation of ‘contiguity’ has a very broad meaning. For example, when there are certain objects, 
C, D, E, etc., between a cause A and an effect B, it can be said that A and B are contiguous, were all of them in the re-
lation of ‘contiguity’. 
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and D2 lies in the nature of the connection between cause and effect. In D1, the manner of connecting a 
cause with an effect is expressed as a ‘constant conjunction’, while in D2 it is expressed as follows: ‘the idea, 
of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more 
lively idea of the other’. Namely, in D2, it is a ‘determination of the mind’ that connects the ‘collision’ 
(cause) to the ‘motion’ (effect). 
To address this apparently puzzling conclusion, Hume proceeds to his argument in the Treatise, con-
centrating his effort on asserting that we can neither perceive nor demonstrate the existence of those 
‘powers’ of connection that many traditional causal theories suppose. However, it is misleading to conclude 
from this that there is no causation in the world, or that we do not have causal reasoning.6 Hume then 
proceeds to change the target of the observing, from the objects themselves to the observer, that is, from the 
objects to the ‘I’ who observe(s) the objects. He states: 
(…) But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but pro-
duces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent 
repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin’d by custom to 
consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the 
first object. ’Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity. (T 
1.3.14.1) 
Thus it is not strictly from the memory of ‘collisions of billiard balls’ that have often happened in the past 
that we find the idea of necessity that connects a cause to an effect. Yet, from observing this very experience, 
we now find that, in our minds, there are certain customs of connecting particular pairs of objects. It is this 
natural connection (association) of ideas that enables a necessary connection of causality. In the Treatise, 
this argument of concluding ‘determination of the mind’ as an origin of the idea of necessity corresponds to 
the latter half of D2. 
Taken together, while D1 expresses the relationships of ‘contiguity’, ‘succession’, and ‘constant con-
junction’ as something witnessed by the observer, D2 expresses, in addition to ‘contiguity’ and ‘succession’, 
the manner of the connection, describing it as a natural association of ideas in the mind of the observer. 
However, as mentioned earlier, many thinkers have criticized Hume’s definitions7. The criticisms put forth 
by Thomas Reid and Lord Kames are especially useful in posing the problems. 
 
 
                                                          
6  Here, I do not mean that Hume’s main claim is not an anti-causal realism, but that Hume argues that it is too hasty to 
reach anti-causal realism based only on the impossibility of perceiving or demonstrating the existence of the ‘powers’. 
There are many interpretations of Hume’s final conclusion of his causal theory, e.g. causal-realist-interpretations or an-
ti-causal-realist-interpretations, yet my intention here is to analyze Hume’s text, taking as neutral a position as possible.  
7  Apart from the Scottish School of Common Sense, which included contemporaries of Hume, there are modern critics 
such as Michael Tooley who are referred to as ‘anti-Humean’. 
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1.3. Criticisms by the Scottish School of Common Sense 
From the 18th century to the 19th century, many members of the Scottish School of Common Sense, in-
cluding Reid, were greatly influenced by Hume. From the assumption of regarding Hume’s ‘idealistic phi-
losophy’ as rooted in the idealism of Descartes, they criticized Hume for reaching an impasse in his scepti-
cism and, focusing on ‘common sense’, favoured direct intuition rather than indirect ideas. Reid criticized 
Hume’s definitions of cause rather caustically: 
It follows from this definition of a cause, that night is the cause of day, and day the cause of night. For 
no two things have more constantly followed each other since the beginning of the world. (Reid 
Thomas8, p.249) 
Lord Kames, who was one of the founders of the Scottish School of Common Sense, was equally critical: 
In a garrison, the soldiers constantly turn out at a certain beat of the drum. The gates of the town are 
opened and shut regularly, as the clock points at a certain hour. These connected facts are observed by 
a child, are associated in his mind, and the association becomes habitual during a long life. The man 
however, if not a changeling, never imagines the beat of the drum to be the cause of the motion of the 
soldiers; nor the pointing of the clock to a certain hour, to be the cause of the opening or shutting of 
the gates. (Lord Kames9, p.299) 
While Reid criticizes D1, Lord Kames challenges D2. As is clear from their words, they argue that if we 
were to accept Hume’s causal theory, relationships that are in reality not in any way causal would be 
treated as causal. Furthermore, they assert that if identifying causal relationships was nothing more than a 
‘determination of the mind’, such relationships would vary from one person’s experience of ‘constant 
conjunction’ to another’s. 
Two points from these criticisms can be used to advance the discussion. First, in his criticism, Reid 
noted that a ‘causal relationship’ is reduced to ‘contiguity’, ‘succession’, and ‘constant conjunction’ in 
Hume’s definitions. That is, in Reid’s view, Hume’s definitions were simply a rephrasing of the notion of a 
‘causal relationship’ using other words. Is this really a proper assessment? Did Hume really intend his def-
inition to be merely a rephrasing? These questions will be considered shortly. 
The core issue in Lord Kames’ criticism is the problem of our experiences. As previously noted, while 
D1 commits only to the relationship between objects, D2 considers the relationship to be a matter of asso-
ciation of ideas in the mind of an individual, which is dependent on one’s experiences. Thus, while D1 does 
not require experience, D2 does, raising the question of whether objects that are inherently the same will be 
considered differently under the two definitions. This issue will be taken up in the next chapter. 
                                                          
8  Reid Thomas, Essays on the Active powers of Man (1788) 
9  Henry Home (Lord Kames), Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (1779)  
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2. Analytical arguments 
A brief survey of the arguments of J.A. Robinson, T.J. Richards, and D. Gotterbarn, which dealt with the 
problems of inherent relationships between D1 and D2 is presented next. 
 
2. 1. J.A. Robinson, ‘Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”’ (1962) 
Robinson points out that the two definitions are not equivalence, either intentionally or extensionally, in a 
more refined way than Lord Kames. According to Robinson, we can suppose a situation in which a cause 
and effect pair that satisfies D1 (C(x, y)) has never been experienced by an observer, meaning that this C(x, 
y) fails to satisfy D2. Likewise, we can also suppose a situation in which a C(x, y) that satisfies D2 in the 
mind of an observer was formed by extra-ordinary experiences, characteristic only of this observer. In such 
a case, C(x, y) satisfies only D2. (Consider the examples of Lord Kames.) Hence, Robinson concludes that 
not only are the definitions different in meaning in reality, but also that we cannot logically establish an 
equivalence of the definitions, even when each definitions is applied to the same object. 
Robinson seeks to explain why Hume proposed these two inequivalent definitions as equivalent, ulti-
mately concluding that Hume’s distinction of definitions corresponds to the two distinctive directions of 
Hume’s philosophy. On the one hand, Hume is ‘pursuing the philosophical task of analysing and clarifying 
concepts’, in which direction D1 proceeds; on the other hand, he is ‘propounding what amounts to an em-
pirical law of psychology’, in which direction D2 proceeds. As Hume subtitled the Treatise ‘An Attempt to 
Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects’, he sought to describe ‘causal rela-
tion’ as a mental phenomenon in D2. In contrast, he analysed the concept of a ‘causal relation’ in D1. For 
Robinson, then, it is not D2 that strictly conforms to the term ‘definition’; rather it is D1. Hence, he con-
cludes that only D1 serves as Hume’s definition of ‘causal relation’. D2 is not definitional, but rather it is a 
mere ‘restatement’ of D1. In this way, Robinson treats D1 as central and D2 as complementary. 
 
2. 2. T.J. Richards, ‘Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”’ (1962) 
Richards rejected Robinson’s interpretation, asserting that both D1 and D2 are ‘definitions’ after all. He 
points out an inherent inconsistency in Robinson’s theory. Robinson essentially argues that (a) the defini-
tions are not equivalent and that (b) that which is defined by D1 is restated in D2. According to Richards, 
however, (a) and (b) are inconsistent; although Robinson regards D2 as derived from D1, there exist certain 
cases that satisfy D2 but not D1. Accordingly, if we accept Robinson’s theory, D2 would allow ‘false 
statements’. 
Richards puts an emphasis on Hume’s statement that (the two definitions are) ‘only different by their 
presenting a different view of the same object’10 (T 1.3.14.31) and asserts that both definitions should be 
treated as distinct ‘definitions’. According to Richards, each definition has its own issue: a problem of 
                                                          
1 0  Emphasis added. 
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‘What is being asserted?’ (D1) and ‘What states of affairs must obtain for the asserter properly to believe 
that A causes B?’ (D2). 
 
In order to reject Robinson’s assertion, Richards attempts to establish two points. First, D2 is not a de-
rivative of D1, but is formed independently. Secondly, D2 is not a ‘restatement of the empirical law of 
psychology’, but a perfect ‘definition’. For the first point, focusing on Hume’s referring to the relationship 
in D1 as a ‘philosophical relation’ and the relationship in D2 as a ‘natural relation’11, Richards asserts that a 
‘natural relation’ is an associating property that emerges naturally and does not arise from ‘philosophical 
relations’ that contain mere unnatural comparisons. To this second point, Richards, again focusing on the 
notion of a ‘natural relation’, states that ‘to say that a relation is natural is to say that the two related ob-
jects A and B are related in such a way as to bring about an association of ideas’12. In other words, he asserts 
that in D2, Hume, on the presupposition that there are natural causal associations of ideas in us, analyzed 
this manner of associating. Richards concludes that ‘D2 does then allude to an empirical psychological 
matter, but D2 itself is strictly a definition’13.  
 
2. 3. D. Gotterbarn, ‘Hume’s Two Lights on Cause’ (1971) 
In response to the arguments of Robinson and Richards, Gotterbarn provides an interpretation intended to 
promote a better understanding of Hume’s statement that (the two definitions are) ‘only different, by their 
presenting a different view of the same object’ (T 1.3.14.31). It is notable that Gotterbarn uses the word 
‘same’ not as equal intentionally, but rather as equal extensionally. According to Gotterbarn, Robinson’s 
assertion that the ‘definitions are not equal extensionally’ (part of his broader assertion that the definitions 
are equal ‘neither extensionally nor intentionally’) is a false interpretation of Hume’s theory. Gotterbarn 
attributes Robinson’s failure to his misunderstanding of Hume’s statement of ‘a different view of the same 
object’. 
According to Gotterbarn, there are two reasons for this extensional misunderstanding. First, although it 
might appear that a causal relation defined by D2 requires an ‘observer’ of the relation while D1 does not, 
in reality this is not the case. If the definitions did in fact differ on this point, then some causal pairs could 
satisfy one or the other of the two definitions, but not both. In reality, however, argues Gotterbarn, not 
                                                          
1 1  Hume characterized the causal relation defined in D1 as ‘philosophical’ and the one defined in D2 as ‘natural’. (T 
1.3.6.16, T 1.3.14.31, etc.) This characterization is based on his division of relationships into two types in T.1.1.4-5. 
There Hume states that, while a ‘natural relation’ is a relation used in our daily life, a ‘philosophical relation’ is a rela-
tion used only in philosophy. A ‘natural relation’ is a ‘natural’ property of connecting (associating) ideas, which Hume 
expresses as ‘a gentle force’. For a ‘philosophical relation’, the scope of the meaning of ‘natural relation’ is extended, and 
even objects that we usually consider to ‘have no relationship’ are considered to ‘have a certain relationship’ in that they 
are ‘compared’ to each other. According to Hume, there are three ‘natural relations’ and seven ‘philosophical relations’. 
It is remarkable that ‘causation’ (cause and effect) is included in both categories. 
1 2  Richards, p.379 
1 3  ibid. 
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only D2 but also D1 requires an ‘observer’. According to Gotterbarn, this stems from Hume’s designation 
of a ‘philosophical relation’ as the ‘comparison of ideas’, which of necessity ‘requires an agent or comparer 
to do the comparing’14.  
The second reason for such an extensional misunderstanding is rooted in the idea that there does not 
seemingly exist in D1 the ‘determination of the mind’ that is a central factor in D2. According to Gotter-
barn, however, both D2 and D1 involve this factor. To make his case, Gotterbarn focuses on the word ‘like’ 
in D1. In the second half of D1, Hume uses the phrase ‘all the objects … are placed in like relations’ (a part 
of ‘where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to 
those objects that resemble the latter’)15. Gotterbarn points out that this phrase asserts uniformity theory, 
which requires a mental determination in Humean causal theory. Thus, ‘in D1 the mental determination is 
implicit and in D2 it is explicit’16. 
Based on this reasoning, Gotterbarn asserts that we can achieve a clearer understanding of Hume’s use 
of the phrase ‘a different view of the same object’. Gotterbarn states that ‘just as we can talk of a single 
white sphere by talking about either its color or figure, depending on which we want to emphasize, so we 
can offer either D1 or D2 as definitions of the causal relation depending on whether we want to emphasize 
its role as a philosophical or a natural relation’17. 
 
The above is a survey of the ‘analytical arguments’ concerning the problem of Hume’s ‘definitions of 
cause’. I regard these arguments as transforming traditional criticisms, such as that offered by Reid, re-
freshing the essential questions, analysing them logically, and searching for the meaning of Hume’s de-
scription. However, if we inquire further, there arises another question: What precisely is meant by ‘define’ 
in Hume’s ‘definitions of cause’? ‘Anti-analytical arguments’ mainly deal with this issue. 
 
3. Anti-analytical arguments 
3. 1. N. Kemp-Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (1941) 
Norman Kemp-Smith was epoch-making in that his work marked a new trend in Hume-interpretation—the 
‘naturalistic’ interpretation—which directly opposed the total-sceptic interpretations such as those of Reid 
and Beattie. According to Kemp-Smith, the intent of the Treatise was not to advance a destructive scepti-
cism, seen as a continuation of the ‘idealism of Locke and Berkeley’, but to reject the traditional Western 
view of the ‘rational human’ and revalue the role of emotion. Following this course of interpretation, 
Kemp-Smith interprets Hume’s definitions as ‘ostensive’ ones. When we try to explain ‘red’, for example, 
we cannot describe it without using some instance of redness, such as ‘the red of this apple’. In this way, we 
                                                          
1 4  Gotterbarn, p.387, emphasis added. 
1 5  Identified earlier as D1b, emphasis added. 
1 6  Gotterbarn, p.389 
1 7  ibid., p.390 
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are explaining something ‘ostensively’. According to Kemp-Smith, Hume did not strictly define ‘cause’ as 
analytical researchers insist, but rather he expressed the meaning of it by using words ‘foreign to it’, ‘os-
tensively’.  
The reason Hume’s definitions are not so-called logical ones is that the causal relation that Hume pre-
sents is not an intelligible knowledge, but a mere belief. Quoting Hume’s paragraph refuting an assumed 
antagonist (T 1.3.14.27), Kemp-Smith summarizes Hume’s position as follows: Hume’s thesis is ‘(1) that 
causal connection, as a mode of necessitated connection, is felt by the mind, and that this feeling is the 
impression which makes possible to the mind the idea of such causal connection; and (2) that while we are 
thus in possession of the idea, it is not the kind of idea which can render real connection in any instance 
whatsoever intelligible to us’18. He adds, ‘thanks to the “quality of human nature”’, we are certainly pos-
sessed of the idea of necessary connection in a manner that we feel an impression naively, i.e. we feel as (if) 
apprehending an independently existing object. However, Kemp-Smith argues, we cannot have distinct no-
tions of the ideas of causal terms such as agency, necessary connection, etc., but only find them mysterious 
and barely intelligible. Thus, as we have no choice but to suppose causation imaginarily, Hume is con-
strained to recognize that causation can be defined only in terms foreign to it19. ‘When we approach it as a 
philosophical relation we can define it only in terms of mere uniformity. When we treat it as a natural re-
lation, we can define it only as a determination of the mind, not of the objects concerned ’20.  
In referring to Hume’s use of ‘determination’ in his definition of ‘causation’, Kemp-Smith allows that 
‘clearly “determination” is here more or less synonymous with causation’, apparently recognizing that, in 
so doing, Hume appears to violate his own objection to using such a definitional device. (Although Hume 
states that ‘the terms of EFFICACY, AGENCY, POWER, (…) are all nearly synonymous; and therefore it is 
an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest’ (T 1.3.14.4), it seems that Hume himself defines 
causation by using a synonymous word, ‘determination’.) According to Kemp-Smith, however, ‘since in so 
doing he was not professing to disclose the idea of causation by way of the definition, but only to be re-
sorting to causation in these two modes for the purpose of giving a causal account of the origin of our idea 
of it, and of the use to which we then put it, there is no real inconsistency in his method of procedure’21. 
 
3. 2. G. Strawson, The Secret Connection (1989) 
Galen Strawson expands Kemp-Smith’s idea of ‘mysterious causation’ —causation incapable of being re-
                                                          
1 8  Kemp-Smith, p.398 
1 9  The subtlety of expressions with which Hume states his definitions is noteworthy: ‘We may define a CAUSE to be 
(...D1...). If this definition be esteemed defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may substitute this 
other definition in its place, viz. (…D2…). Shou’d this definition also be rejected for the same reason, I know no other 
remedy, than that the persons, who express this delicacy, shou’d substitute a juster definition in its place’ (T 1.3.14.31) 
Emphasis added. 
2 0  Kemp-Smith, p.400 
2 1  ibid., p.402 
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duced to another concept—into ‘sceptical realism’, interpreting Hume’s causal theory as follows: Hume’s 
argument that ‘we cannot perceive any causal power in the objects’ is ‘merely epistemological’ and is not 
truly an argument denying the existence of ‘causal power’ in the objects. According to Strawson, ‘when we 
talk of causal connection between two objects we do not really mean the real causal connection between 
them (which of course exists), but (given the theory of ideas) mean only that they have acquired a connec-
tion in our thought on account of having been observed to be constantly conjoined’22. Thus, Hume epis-
temologically noted the profound limitations on the human capacity to grasp the nature of reality . Straw-
son insists that, ‘in our unreflective moments (or alternatively our excessively exalted philosophical mo-
ments) we are pretty sure we know about causal power in the objects if we know about anything . (…) This 
would certainly be an extraordinary conclusion, but I (Strawson) do not think it ever crossed Hume’s mind’, 
because Hume’s point is that, ‘despite the fact that there is (of course) such a thing as Causation or causal 
power, and despite the fact that it is all around us, all pervasive, governing our thoughts and actions and 
our world in all respects, still human understanding is utterly incapable of grasping its true nature in any 
way’23. 
According to Strawson, then, in any attempt to understand the idea of causation, we have no choice but 
to ‘define’ it imperfectly24 by using words foreign to it. Hence, Strawson regards Hume’s ‘definitions of 
cause’ as ‘seriously imperfect’. Both Kemp-Smith and Strawson appeal to Hume’s phrase ‘drawn from 
something foreign to cause’ to interpret his ‘definitions of cause’, but their conclusions are somewhat dif-
ferent. While Kemp-Smith regards them not as strict definitions but as ostensive, yet still genuine, defini-
tions, Strawson regards them as imperfect definitions, incapable of ever truly defining ‘real’ causation. 
Accordingly, Strawson understands Hume’s definitions in a sceptical-realistic sense: Even in full awareness 
of the impossibility of ‘defining’ causation, Hume clarified that all we can get to know of causation is the 
content of the two definitions’25 He states that by using such a subtle manner in arguing that ‘if D1 be es-
teemed defective, because drawn from objects foreign to the cause, we may substitute D2, and if D2 also be 
rejected for the same reason, Hume knows no other remedy’. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have surveyed the various interpretations of Hume’s ‘definitions of cause’ as presented near 
the end of his causal theory in the Treatise and in the first Enquiry. It can be said that the critical refutations 
of Hume’s definitions offered by Lord Kames and Reid provided a foundation for Robinson’s criticism that 
the two definitions are not equivalent, either intentionally or extensionally. Richards and Gotterbarn at-
                                                          
2 2  Strawson, p.206 
2 3  ibid., pp.206-7 
2 4  As to the word ‘imperfect’, Strawson quotes from the first Enquiry, which depicts it more clearly than does the Trea-
tise: ‘So imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that is impossible to give any just definition of cause, ex-
cept what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it.’ (E 7.2.29) 
2 5  Strawson, p.210 
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tempted to overcome this inequivalence.  In chapter 2, these arguments were collectively characterized as 
‘analytical arguments’ dealing only with the logical equivalence between the two definitions. In chapter 3, 
the criticisms by Kemp-Smith and Strawson were presented as ‘anti-analytical arguments’ opposed to the 
analytic interpreters’ idea that Hume did (or at least tried to) ‘define (reduce into some other concept)’ 
causation.  
   It can be argued that the former (analytical) arguments do not touch the core of Hume’s causal theory 
since they stick to only one issue, equivalence. In contrast, the ‘anti-analytical arguments’ can be said to try 
to interpret ‘definitions of cause’ from a broader view. However, one can ask whether Kemp-Smith and 
Strawson properly comprehend Hume’s texts, in that they treat his ‘definitions of cause’ to suit their own 
‘Hume’. What is important is understanding Hume’s intention in concluding his causal theory by presenting 
these definitions. In my opinion, the reason that Hume’s causal theory has had such great influence on later 
philosophy is that it introduced the empirical observation of cause and effect; that is, it introduced the 
‘experimental method of reasoning’. Although it led to a destructive conclusion, Hume carried out the 
method thoroughly. And while Hume’s definitions were widely criticized because of this destructive con-
clusion, as the prominent results of a thorough empiricism, they became the foundation of a new stream of 
causal theory that treated causation as regularity, giving us the regularity view of causation. In concluding 
this thesis, I propose as my future task a thorough examination of Hume’s ‘definitions of cause’ based on 
these two important aspects— the destructive conclusion of the two definitions and their role in promoting 
the practice of empiricism. 
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